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Article 1

ARTICLES

The Roots of Removal

*

Debra Lyn Bassett†
Rex R. Perschbacher‡
Academic observers of federal litigation generally describe the field by
reference to its constitutional and statutory foundations. Also at play
within this landscape are powerful normative policy elements
recognized by scholars and practitioners—at least implicitly—as
essential to an adequate description of the litigation choices available
to the participants. One of these policy features is the oft-repeated
maxim that the plaintiff is the master of the claim. Although this basic
premise quietly dominates both academic discussions and practice
realities, a number of factors operate to impose very real limitations on
that principle. These limitations, in turn, shape how we approach
federal litigation and include, specifically, how we approach federal
court jurisdiction. One of these limitations on a plaintiff’s power that
implicates federal jurisdiction is removal—and removal provides an
instructive example of the exceptionally rich environment where policy
elements interact with constitutional and statutory features. Removal
is a means of moving a state court lawsuit into federal court, and
approximately thirty thousand civil cases are transferred in this
manner annually. Through removal, under certain circumstances, a
defendant is able to defeat the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Thus,
removal inherently raises questions about what limitations should be
placed on a plaintiff’s choice of forum. These questions have been
answered in different ways depending on the specific issue and the
timing, which includes both the historical context and the litigation
point in time. Three particular aspects of removal law illustrate the
dramatic way in which these differences unfold. As a general matter,
when removal occurs at the very outset of a lawsuit, the procedures are
quite straightforward. However, removal instituted after the initial
*

© 2011 Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher. All rights reserved.
Justice Marshall F. McComb Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.
‡
Professor of Law and Daniel J. Dykstra Chair in Law, University of
California, Davis.
†

1

2

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

thirty-day removal period raises more issues and has the potential to
become more complicated. Three of the most difficult issues in removal
law arise in such a subsequently instituted removal context—the first(versus last-) served defendant rule, the voluntary-involuntary rule,
and the one-year limitation for removing diversity cases. Courts and
commentators typically have discussed these issues separately, without
realizing that these issues share an underlying commonality that
yields a surprisingly effective analytical framework: the inherent
tension between deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of forum versus the
defendant’s right of removal.

INTRODUCTION
The law of removal is a study in contradictions. The
United States Constitution expressly authorizes arising-under
and diversity jurisdiction,1 without mentioning removal. Yet
removal is regularly classified as one of the bases for federal court
subject-matter jurisdiction. Because removal is a procedure
rather than a true form of jurisdiction, the Constitution makes no
direct mention of removing cases from state court to federal
court.2 However, the U.S. legal landscape has included removal
since the creation of federal courts; the First Congress enacted
removal procedures in the first Judiciary Act of 1789.3 This gives
removal a unique place in federal court jurisprudence—a
statutory regime of quasi-constitutional character.
At the same time, removal runs directly contrary to one
of the most deeply embedded, yet implicit, maxims of United
States adversarial procedure: the plaintiff is the master of his
or her claim.4 The unresolved and ongoing tension between
1

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2009) (“The right to remove a case from a state court to a
federal court is purely statutory . . . .”); see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816) (“This power of removal is not to be found in express terms in
any part of the constitution . . . .”).
3
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79; 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 2, § 3721.
4
Despite the lack of scholarly commentary, those who are involved in the
practice of law in this country, and those of us teaching it, each accept the baseline norm
that among the choices available by law, plaintiffs have the initial choice of judicial
system (federal or state depending upon the limits of subject-matter jurisdiction), the
parties who will join as plaintiffs, the parties to be named as defendants (assuming
personal jurisdiction is available for court process to reach them), and the place of trial
(venue). This plaintiff-choice system has been acknowledged by no less than the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1982); Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960). Moreover, plaintiffs are able to take advantage of any
jurisdiction in which the action can be brought and where the statute of limitations
against the plaintiff’s claim has not run, even if only one such state remains. See Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984).
2
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these two concepts—that of the defendant’s right to remove
versus the plaintiff as master of the claim—continues to be
seen in court decisions characterizing the defendant’s ability to
remove as inferior to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.5
Despite the continuing debate over the historical
purpose of diversity jurisdiction6 and the paucity of historical
documentation,7 the theories as to diversity’s purpose originate
in the concept of local bias or prejudice.8 Diversity offers a rich
context in the conflict between removal, a defendant’s tool, and
the plaintiff’s traditional role as master of the claim.
Strict application of the rule that gives plaintiffs
absolute mastery of the litigation would allow plaintiffs, but
not defendants, the right to choose to invoke federal diversity
jurisdiction in qualifying cases and avoid the dangers of local
bias, or nevertheless to select the state forum and its attendant
risks of local bias. Defendants would simply have to live with
the plaintiff’s forum (and other) choices. Removal provides a
significant counterbalance. Rather than according the plaintiff
exclusive control over the choice between a federal forum versus
a state forum, as would be consistent with the “plaintiff as
master of the claim” maxim, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
for removal, which expressly permits a defendant to defeat the
plaintiff’s forum choice. The original draft bill authorized
5

See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 219 n.11 (5th Cir.
1998) (“The defendant’s right to remove and the plaintiff’s right to choose the forum are
not equal . . . .” (quoting 16 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 107.05 (3d ed. 1997)), rev’d, 526 U.S. 574 (1999); Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange,
167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (“The plaintiff’s right to choose his forum
is superior to the defendant’s right of removal.”).
6
Compare Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) (“Diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in
state courts against those not citizens of the state.”), with Henry J. Friendly, The Historic
Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 496-97 (1928) (“The desire to
protect creditors against legislation favorable to debtors was a principal reason for the
grant of diversity jurisdiction.”); see also 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601, at 13, 15 (3d ed. 2009) (noting “the traditional
explanation, and the one most often cited by federal judges and legal scholars, of the
purpose of the constitutional provision for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and its
immediate congressional implementation—the fear that state courts would be prejudiced
against out-of-state litigants”). But see id. § 3601, at 15-16 (“Several historians have
suggested . . . that the real fear . . . was not of the state courts, but of the state
legislatures . . . . The fear of state legislatures may have arisen less from interstate
hostility than from a desire to protect commercial interests from class bias.”).
7
See Friendly, supra note 6, at 484-85 (noting that diversity jurisdiction
“had not bulked large” in the eyes of the Constitution’s framers, “[n]or are the records
of the Convention fruitful to a student of the diversity clause”). See generally Debra
Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 122-36
(2003) (providing historical background of diversity jurisdiction).
8
Bassett, supra note 7, at 119-32.
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removal of any lawsuit for which diversity jurisdiction existed;9
the final version authorized removal only when the plaintiff filed
suit in her home state against an out-of-state defendant.10
The Supreme Court weighed in early on removal and
supported removal in no uncertain terms, expressly rejecting
any contention that only the plaintiff’s forum choice was
entitled to protection:
The [C]onstitution of the United States was designed for the common
and equal benefit of all the people of the United States. The judicial
power was granted for the same benign and salutary purposes. It
was not to be exercised exclusively for the benefit of parties who
might be plaintiffs, and would elect the national forum, but also for
the protection of defendants who might be entitled to try their
rights, or assert their privileges, before the same forum. . . . [A]s the
plaintiff may always elect the state court, the defendant may be
deprived of all the security which the constitution intended in aid of
his rights. Such a state of things can, in no respect, be considered as
giving equal rights. To obviate this difficulty, we are referred to the
power which it is admitted congress possess to remove suits from
state courts to the national courts . . . .11

The view that a defendant’s right of removal has equal
stature and the same constitutional dimension as a plaintiff’s
right to select the forum12 runs contrary to the plaintiff as
master of the claim maxim, because removal’s very purpose lies
in defeating the plaintiff’s choice of forum. However, this
should not be seen as surprising, given the number of
limitations on the plaintiff as master of the claim principle,
both within and without the removal context.13
9

Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 90-91 (1923).
10
Id. at 91; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80 (authorizing
the removal of any action “commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a
citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and
[where] the matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum or value of five hundred
dollars, exclusive of costs”).
11
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348-49 (1816).
12
See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606, 609 (1897) (referring to
“defendant’s constitutional right as a citizen of a different state than the plaintiff, to
choose a federal forum”); Boatmen’s Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650, 655 (8th
Cir. 1905) (stating that a defendant’s right of removal “is of sufficient value and gravity
to be guarantied by the Constitution and the acts of Congress”); In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that a defendant’s right
of removal “emanates from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution”).
13
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)-(b) (2006) (authorizing motions for change of
venue, through which a party may transfer an action to a different federal judicial district
from that where the plaintiff originally filed the suit); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v.
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (despite plaintiff’s election to sue in state
court on a state law–based claim, defendant permitted to remove on the basis of arising
under jurisdiction because the case raised a contested and substantial federal question
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In yet another element of removal’s contradictory
nature, the popular maxim that the courts must construe the
removal statutes strictly does not alter this interpretation. A
strict construction of the removal statutes does not suggest a
bias against removal, nor does it restore the plaintiff as master
of the claim to a superior position. Supreme Court case law
indicates that the strict construction approach has nothing to
do with subjugating defendants or elevating plaintiffs but
instead has everything to do with basic concepts of federalism,14
and thus actions should be removed from state court
jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by federal statute.15
When removal comes within the statutory authority of
28 U.S.C. § 1441, the general removal statute, by definition the
suit is one in which the federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction, so the federal and state courts have
overlapping authority.16 This concurrent power means that
removal does not offend the dignity of state judiciaries unless,
again, the plaintiff as master of the claim is superior to a
defendant’s right to remove—and thus removal serves to
circumvent the state court’s superior claim to adjudicate the
case. This position cannot prevail in a legal regime that allows
removal in order to defeat the plaintiff’s choice of forum under
that the federal court could hear “without disturbing any congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities”); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson,
539 U.S. 1 (2003) (despite plaintiff’s election to sue in state court on a state law based
claim, federal preemption of state law resulted in recharacterization of plaintiff’s claim);
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) (stating that although
the plaintiff had pleaded his claim solely in terms of state law, “at least some of the
claims had a sufficient federal character to support removal”).
14
See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) (stating,
in the removal context, that “[t]he power reserved to the states under the Constitution
to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only
by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution.
‘Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate
federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the
precise limits which the statute has defined.’” (citations omitted)).
15
Shamrock Oil has been cited for the proposition that a plaintiff’s right to
select the forum is superior to the defendant’s right to removal. See, e.g., Auchinleck v.
Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (citing Shamrock Oil
as authority in stating that “[t]he plaintiff’s right to choose his forum is superior to the
defendant’s right of removal”); see also In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270
F. Supp. 2d 357, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Shamrock Oil for “the right of plaintiffs to
choose the forum in which to bring suit”). But Shamrock Oil said no such thing. Indeed,
Shamrock Oil merely held that a plaintiff cannot remove a state court lawsuit to
federal court on the basis of a counterclaim. See Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 106-07.
16
See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 189 (2010) (noting that concurrent powers between the federal government
and the states refers “to a structure in which multiple levels of government within a
single polity possess[] overlapping authority to regulate, legislate, or adjudicate”).
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specified circumstances. As expressed by one commentator,
“Stating that a plaintiff has a superior ‘right’ to select a forum
is merely an unsupported claim, not a self-evident fact.”17
The concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state
courts where removal is properly invoked, removal’s history,
and the statutory authorization of removal all serve to reduce
the plaintiff’s power. “Master of the claim” becomes the
minimalist axiom that the plaintiff chooses the initial court in
which to file the claim subject, whenever federal jurisdiction is
available, to the defendant’s right to rely on the removal
statutes’ authority. The defendant’s right to remove does, and
should, rightfully defeat the plaintiff’s selected forum.
Removal is a popular procedure, transferring
approximately thirty thousand cases annually out of state
courts and into federal courts.18 When a plaintiff files a civil
lawsuit in state court, federal statutes authorize the defendant
to remove the suit from the state court to federal court under
certain specified circumstances and pursuant to specified
procedures.19 The basic removal provisions, especially for
lawsuits that involve a single defendant, are relatively
straightforward and unremarkable. Only a defendant can
remove,20 and a defendant can only effect removal from a state
court to a federal court.21 The federal court to which the lawsuit
is removed must be the federal court for the district and
division encompassing the state court.22 As is true for any
lawsuit that seeks to proceed in federal court, the action must

17

Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV.
609, 638 (2004).
18
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 50 tbl.S-7 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversio
n.pdf (reflecting that 30,161—approximately 11%—of the total filings in federal district
courts were removals).
19
The basic removal provisions are those governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441,
1446, and 1447 (2006). There are other removal statutes that govern specialized
circumstances. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (modifying removal provisions for certain
class actions pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005).
20
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (specifically referring to defendants); Chi., R.I. &
P.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580 (1954) (“The plaintiff under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) . . . cannot remove.”); see also Or. Egg Producers v. Andrew, 458 F.2d 382, 383
(9th Cir. 1972) (“A plaintiff who commences his action in a state court cannot effectuate
removal to a federal court even if he could have originated the action in a federal court
and even if a counterclaim is thereafter filed that states a claim cognizable in federal
court.”). See generally 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3730, at 429 (4th ed. 2009).
21
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
22
Id.

2011]

THE ROOTS OF REMOVAL

7

have a basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.23 A defendant
has thirty days from the date of service to effect removal by
filing a notice of removal in the appropriate federal court and
serving copies on the other parties and the clerk of the state
court.24 If diversity provides the basis for federal subject-matter
jurisdiction, then the defendant may not remove the lawsuit if
he is a citizen of the state where the plaintiff filed the suit.25
Removal
becomes
more
complicated,
and
its
contradictory nature becomes more apparent in a manner that
has bedeviled the courts and commentators, when it does not
occur within the initial thirty-day period. Indeed, three different
removal issues have the potential to come into play in a
subsequently instituted removal situation: the first- (versus last-)
served defendant rule; the voluntary-involuntary rule; and the
one-year limit for removing suits on the basis of diversity.
Encompassing a contradictory variety of underlying principles
and policies, these issues—one expressly created by statute and
the other two judicially created—have resulted in a disjointed
and inconsistent approach to removal that has obscured the
underlying tension intrinsic to the removal concept: a tension
between according deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum
and honoring the defendant’s right to remove. An examination of
these three subsequently instituted removal issues illustrates
the dramatic way that this underlying tension unfolds.
This article analyzes these three issues as they arise in
the subsequently instituted removal context and identifies an
overarching and unifying framework. Part I presents and
analyzes the first-served, last-served, and intermediate rules.26
Part II presents and analyzes the voluntary-involuntary rule.27
Part III presents and analyzes the one-year limit on diversitybased removal.28 Finally, Part IV identifies the common factors
that motivate these removal issues, analyzes the reach of
deference to the plaintiff’s forum choice and of the defendant’s
right to remove, and proposes an overarching framework for
analyzing these three removal issues.29

23

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
Id. § 1446(b), (d).
25
Id. § 1441(b). But see id. § 1453 (eliminating this restriction for certain
class actions pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005).
26
See infra notes 30-98 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 99-137 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
24
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THE FIRST-SERVED, LAST-SERVED, AND INTERMEDIATE
RULES

Title 28 of the United States Code, at section 1446,
requires a defendant to file a notice of removal within thirty
days of service,30 and case law interpreting section 1441
requires that all defendants joined and served in the action
must consent to removal.31 When a complaint names multiple
defendants, the potential exists that—whether due to the
plaintiff’s intentional staggering of service or unanticipated
service difficulties—all defendants will not be served on the
same day. The removal statutes are silent as to how to
reconcile the thirty-day time limit with differences in the
timing of service of multiple defendants. Accordingly, the
federal courts created the first-served, last-served, and
intermediate rules as interpretations of how courts should
implement the statutory removal timing restrictions.32 The
significance of these rules stems from their connection to still
another judicially created rule—the rule of unanimity.33 The
rule of unanimity34 requires all defendants joined and served to
consent to removal subject to some limited exceptions.35
Because all defendants must join in the removal petition and
the removal statute imposes a thirty-day removal window,
courts have struggled to determine how to reconcile these
provisions in multiple-defendant situations when the
defendants were served on different dates.

30

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
See, e.g., Mathews v. Cnty. of Fremont, 826 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Wyo.
1993). See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 3730, at 440, 462.
32
See Lindsay E. Hale, Triggering Removal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446: The
Eleventh Circuit’s Adoption of the Last-Served Defendant Rule in Bailey v. Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc., 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 363, 364 (2008) (noting that as a result of
the lack of clarification within 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) regarding how to calculate the
thirty-day removal period when there are multiple defendants who were served at
different times, the federal courts have created their own interpretations, including the
first-served and last-served defendant rules); see also infra notes 36-38.
33
See Haiber, supra note 17, at 648-49 (noting that the rule of unanimity “is
not found in the text for the removal statutes,” but has “long [been] required” by the
federal courts).
34
See, e.g., Beardsley v. Torrey, 2 F. Cas. 1188, 1189 (C.C.D. Pa. 1822) (No.
1190) (“[I]t is not competent to one defendant to remove the cause without the consent
of his co-defendants.”).
35
See Mathews, 826 F. Supp. at 1318-19 (listing exceptions to the rule of
unanimity, including nominal parties and “where federal jurisdiction of a party is
based on a separate and independent jurisdictional grant”). In addition, certain class
actions need not satisfy the rule of unanimity pursuant to the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1453.
31
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The circuit courts are divided as to the practical
ramifications of such staggered service. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals has adopted the first-served defendant rule,
whereby the time for removal expires thirty days after the first
defendant is served without regard to when other defendants
are served.36 Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the alternative and
contradictory last-served defendant rule, whereby the time for
removal is calculated from the date of service upon the
defendant who attempts removal, regardless of when the first
defendant was served.37 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
has adopted a third view, the so-called intermediate rule,
which requires the filing of the notice of removal within the
first-served defendant’s thirty-day window but permits laterjoined defendants to join that original removal notice within
thirty days of the date of their own, subsequent service.38 The
circuit courts, in choosing among these three alternatives, have
grounded their approaches upon those principles and policies to
which the circuit gives priority.
A.

The Articulated Principles and Policies Motivating the
First-Served Defendant Rule

The first-served defendant rule attempts to reconcile three
general, undisputed removal principles: (1) the statutory
provision for a thirty-day window within which a defendant must
effect removal; (2) the axiom that courts should interpret the
removal statutes strictly; and (3) the rule of unanimity. Under the
first-served defendant rule, the time for removal expires thirty
days after the first defendant is served. This interpretation is in
accord with both the thirty-day window and a strict statutory
construction. The first-served defendant rule also comports with
the rule of unanimity, because if the first-served defendant
prefers to remain in state court and thus does not remove the
action, then this indicates a lack of unanimity among all the
defendants, whenever served, over whether to remove the
36

See Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1986). See
generally 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 3731, at 586.
37
See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2011); Bailey v.
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2008); Marano Enters. of Kan.
v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2001); Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible
Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1999). See generally 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 20, § 3731, at 597-99.
38
Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2011).
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lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit, in adopting the first-served defendant
rule, expressly relied on these three principles.39
In Brown v. Demco, Inc.,40 the plaintiff sued various
defendants in Louisiana state court after suffering an
employment-related injury. The plaintiff was a Louisiana
domiciliary, no defendant was a citizen of Louisiana, and the
plaintiff sought more than $2 million in damages, so federal
diversity jurisdiction was clearly available. Although the
plaintiff served all the defendants promptly, no defendant
removed the action to federal court. Four years later, the
plaintiff amended his complaint to add another defendant.
Within thirty days of service, the newly added defendant filed a
notice of removal in which the other original defendants all
concurred. The Fifth Circuit concluded that removal was
improper because it fell outside the thirty days allotted to the
first-served defendant to remove.
[The first-served defendant rule] follows logically from the
unanimity requirement, the thirty-day time limit, and the fact that a
defendant may waive removal by proceeding in state court.
Moreover, by restricting removal to instances in which the statute
clearly permits it, the rule is consistent with the trend to limit
removal jurisdiction and with the axiom that the removal statutes
are to be strictly construed against removal.41

With respect to the effect of the first-served rule upon the
ability of later-served defendants to remove, the court stated
that it did not perceive any unfairness to later-served
defendants42 and observed that an alternative approach would
introduce delay and uncertainty.43
Although Brown involved distinctive facts due to the
four-year interim before the addition of the final defendant, the
Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion in a subsequent case
involving a much smaller disparity in the timing of service. In
Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,44 the plaintiff
served one defendant on September 3, another defendant on
September 5, and the third defendant on September 24.45 The
39

Brown, 792 F.2d at 478, 481-82.
Id.
41
Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
42
However, of course, under the first-served defendant rule, a belatedly
served defendant has no opportunity to remove in such an instance despite the
statutory removal authority.
43
Brown, 792 F.2d at 482.
44
841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988).
45
Id. at 1256.
40
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first defendant filed a notice of removal on September 26,
within the thirty-day window and after the plaintiff had served
all defendants.46 However, the last-served defendant did not
consent to removal until October 24—within thirty days of its
own service, but not within thirty days of service upon the firstserved defendant.47 The Fifth Circuit found removal improper:
It follows that since all served defendants must join in the petition,
and since the petition must be submitted within thirty days of
service on the first defendant, all served defendants must join in the
petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first
defendant was served. This rule . . . promotes unanimity among the
defendants without placing undue hardships on subsequently served
defendants. Indeed, if a removal petition is filed by a served
defendant and another defendant is served after the case is thus
removed, the latter defendant may still either accept the removal or
exercise its right to choose the state forum by making a motion to
remand.48

The last-served defendant rule offers an alternative
approach, although motivated by exactly the same principles
and policies.
B.

The Articulated Principles and Policies Motivating the
Last-Served Defendant Rule

The last-served defendant rule attempts to reconcile the
same three removal principles as the first-served rule, albeit
with a different emphasis and conclusion: (1) the statute
provides a thirty-day window within which a defendant must
effect removal; (2) the axiom that courts should interpret the
removal statutes strictly; and (3) the rule of unanimity. More
recent cases have also asserted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc.,49 supports the last-served defendant rule.
In Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc.,50 the
plaintiff sued two defendants in state court. The first-served
defendant removed the suit to federal court, but the federal
court remanded the case when the defendant could not prove
the citizenship of the codefendant and thus could not

46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1263 (footnotes omitted).
526 U.S. 344 (1999).
184 F.3d 527, 528 (6th Cir. 1999).
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demonstrate the existence of complete diversity.51 After
remand, the plaintiff served the second defendant, who filed a
notice of removal within thirty days of that service; the first
defendant filed a notice of consent to the removal on the same
day.52 The Sixth Circuit found removal proper.
In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit stated that
each defendant must be accorded thirty days in which to remove,
because an alternative construction (i.e., the first-served rule)
“would require us to insert ‘first’ before ‘defendant’ into the
language of the statute.”53 The court viewed the rule of unanimity
as permitting the earlier-served defendant to consent to the lastserved defendant’s removal, even though the first defendant had
failed in its removal attempt, because “holding otherwise would
vitiate the removal application of the later-served defendants and
thereby nullify our holding that later-served defendants are
entitled to 30 days to remove the case to district court.”54
In Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.,55 an Eleventh
Circuit decision, the plaintiff sued three defendants in state
court and served the defendants on three different dates: May
12, May 15, and June 22. All three defendants were
represented by the same lawyer, who filed a notice of removal
on July 24.56 The Eleventh Circuit noted the circuit split with
respect to the first- and last-served defendant rules,57 but
concluded that “both common sense and considerations of
equity favor the last-served defendant rule. The first-served
rule has been criticized by other courts as being inequitable to
later-served defendants who, through no fault of their own,
might, by virtue of the first-served rule, lose their statutory
right to seek removal.”58
51

Id. at 530.
Id. at 530-31.
53
Id. at 533 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar
construction. See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The removal
statute speaks of ‘the defendant’—not ‘first defendant’ or ‘initial defendant’—and its
most straightforward meaning is that each defendant has thirty days to remove after
being brought into the case.”).
54
Brierly, 184 F.3d at 534.
55
536 F.3d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 2008).
56
Id. The notice of removal was within the last-served defendant’s thirty-day
window because thirty days from receipt of service was July 22, 2006, a Saturday.
Thus, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a), the last day for filing was Monday, July 24,
2006. Id. at 1204 n.1.
57
Id. at 1205.
58
Id. at 1206. The Ninth Circuit has also endorsed this rationale. See
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 955 (stating that the last-served defendant rule is “grounded in
statutory construction, equity and common sense” and that the approach “treats all
defendants equally, regardless of when they happen to be served”).
52
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The Eleventh Circuit further noted that the last-served
rule was consistent with both the rule of unanimity and a strict
construction of the removal statutes:
[T]he last-served rule is not inconsistent with the rule of unanimity.
Earlier-served defendants may choose to join in a later-served
defendant’s motion or not, therefore preserving the rule that a notice
of removal must have the unanimous consent of the defendants. The
unanimity rule alone does not command that a first-served
defendant’s failure to seek removal necessarily waives an unserved
defendant’s right to seek removal; it only requires that the laterserved defendant receive the consent of all then-served defendants at
the time he files his notice of removal. . . . [W]e do not find that a
strict construction of the removal statute necessarily compels us to
endorse the first-served defendant rule . . . .59

In addition, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the
Supreme Court’s Murphy Brothers decision60 supported the lastserved defendant rule and stated that absent the Murphy
Brothers decision, “the issue of which rule to endorse would be
a closer call.”61 In light of Murphy Brothers’ significance to the
Eleventh Circuit, and its mention by both the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits,62 some brief exploration of that case is
warranted at this juncture.
The issue in Murphy Brothers involved which of two
events triggered the thirty-day removal window: the date that
the defendant was formally served with process, or a previous
date when the defendant had been faxed a courtesy copy of the
complaint. The answer might have seemed obvious until one
reviewed the relevant statutory language, which states that
“[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be
filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading

59

Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1207. The Ninth Circuit has endorsed this rationale as
well. See Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956 (observing that “the fact that a defendant hasn’t
taken the initiative to seek removal doesn’t necessarily mean he will object when
another defendant does”).
60
Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
61
Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1208.
62
See Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956 (citing Murphy Bros. as exemplifying the
Supreme Court’s relaxation of the traditional axiom that the removal statutes are to be
strictly construed); see also Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753,
756 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that Murphy Brothers indicated that “if faced with the
issue before us today, the [Supreme] Court would allow each defendant thirty days
after receiving notice within which to file a notice of removal, regardless of when—or
if—previously served defendants had filed such notices”).
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setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or
proceeding is based . . . .”63
On the basis of the reference to “or otherwise,” the
Eleventh Circuit had held that the defendant’s receipt of the
faxed courtesy copy of the complaint started the thirty-day
removal window.64 The Supreme Court reversed and stated that
the removal provisions are subject to the “bedrock principle”
that “[a]n individual or entity named as a defendant is not
obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and
brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.”65 The
Court went on to explain that the statutory language reflected
Congress’s attempt to create a uniform rule that would
accommodate the vagaries of state provisions—in particular,
under the practices of some states, service of process was
considered to commence the action and service could precede
the filing of the complaint, which created the potential that the
removal window could close before the defendant had seen the
complaint.66 However, the majority observed, “Nothing in the
legislative history . . . so much as hints that Congress, in
making changes to accommodate atypical state commencement
and complaint filing procedures, intended to dispense with the
historic function of service of process as the official trigger for
responsive action by an individual or entity named
defendant.”67 Further, the majority noted, fax machines did not
exist at the time that Congress drafted this provision, so it
could not have anticipated this specific scenario.68
Murphy Brothers involved a single defendant rather
than multiple defendants, and thus did not discuss the first- or
63

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
See Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 349.
65
Id. at 347.
66
Id. at 351. The Senate Report explained the problem and the statutory
accommodation as follows:
64

In some States suits are begun by the service of a summons or other process
without the necessity of filing any pleading until later. . . . [T]his places the
defendant in the position of having to take steps to remove a suit to Federal
court before he knows what the suit is about. As said section is herein
proposed to be rewritten, a defendant is not required to file his petition for
removal until 20 [now 30] days after he has received (or it has been made
available to him) a copy of the initial pleading filed by the plaintiff setting
forth the claim upon which the suit is based and the relief prayed for. It is
believed that this will meet the varying conditions of practice in all the
States.
S. REP. NO. 81-303, at 6 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248, 1254.
67
Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 352-53.
68
Id. at 353 n.5.
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last-served defendant rules. Moreover, by emphasizing service
of process as critical to triggering the thirty-day removal
window, the Court expressed no opinion in support or
opposition to the competing first- and last-served defendant
rules, both of which rely upon timing rules dating from service
of process and nothing else. Nevertheless, the Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have relied on the case
in endorsing the last-served defendant rule.69 All three circuits
have characterized Murphy Brothers as representing a shift
away from the traditional strict construction of the removal
statutes and relied on language in Murphy Brothers in stating
that defendants “are not required to take action . . . until they
are properly served, ‘regardless of when—or if—previously
served defendants had filed such notices.’”70 Therefore,
according to these three circuits, the first-served defendant
rule adopts a construction that would obligate a defendant to
seek removal before receiving formal process.71
This leads us to the third view addressing removal in
the context of the staggered service of multiple defendants,
referred to by its proponent circuit as “the intermediate rule.”
C.

The Articulated Principles and Policies Motivating the
Intermediate Rule

In what is now a familiar theme, the intermediate rule
once again attempts to reconcile (1) the statutory thirty-day
window within which a defendant must effect removal; (2) the
axiom that courts should strictly interpret the removal
statutes; and (3) the rule of unanimity. The intermediate rule,
as described by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, “requires a notice of removal to be filed within the
first-served defendant’s thirty-day window, but gives laterserved defendants thirty days from the date they were served
to join the notice of removal.”72
69

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1208 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 756 and
citing Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. 344); see also Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th
Cir. 2011). Murphy Bros. takes no side in the first- versus last-served defendant
debate. It simply rules out as a triggering date something other than service of process.
71
See Amy G. Doehring, Eleventh Circuit Adopts Last-Served Defendant Rule
for Removal, A.B.A. LITIG. NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, at 2. However, such a defendant
might—for a variety of reasons, including the plaintiff’s default—never be served and
thus play no role in removal.
72
Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2011).
70
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The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Barbour v.
International Union73 is the official source of the intermediate
rule and builds upon language in a previous decision from the
same circuit.74 Despite labeling this position as an intermediate
rule, which suggests that it adopts a compromise position
between the first-served and last-served defendant rules, the
intermediate rule does not operate as a compromise measure—
it is, in effect, consistent with the first-served defendant rule.
In Barbour, Chrysler Corporation retirees sued the
International Union and two local unions—Local 1183 and
Local 1212—in state court for alleged negligence and negligent
misrepresentation in advising the plaintiffs to retire, which
caused the plaintiffs to lose eligibility for a retirement
incentive package known to the defendants but not publicly
announced until two weeks after the plaintiffs retired.75 The
three defendants filed a joint notice of removal on April 28,
more than thirty days after service upon the first defendant,
within thirty days of service upon the second defendant, and
before service upon the third defendant.76 The en banc Fourth
Circuit concluded that “because [the first-served defendant] did
not seek removal within its thirty-day window, the plain
language of [section] 1446(b) dictates that it forfeited its right
to removal.”77 Thus, under the so-called intermediate rule, the
time for removal expires thirty days after the first defendant is
served, without regard to when other defendants are served—
the same result required by the first-served defendant rule.
Although Barbour makes much of according laterserved defendants a full thirty days under the intermediate
rule in which to decide whether to join or challenge the existing
removal notice,78 the distinction between the intermediate rule
and the first-served defendant rule in this regard is more
subtle than Barbour suggests. Under the rule of unanimity, the
73
74

Id.
See McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th

Cir. 1992).
75

Barbour, 640 F.3d at 602-03.
Id. at 604.
77
Id. at 611.
78
Id. at 607 (“Like the First-Served Defendant Rule, the McKinney
Intermediate Rule requires a notice of removal to be filed within the first-served
defendant’s thirty-day window, but gives later-served defendants thirty days from the
date they were served to join the notice of removal.”); see also id. at 611 (“If the firstserved defendant files a notice of removal, later-served defendants have ample time—
thirty days from the date that each such defendant is served—to decide whether to join
the notice of removal . . . .”).
76
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defendants who have been joined and served must all consent
to removal. Later-served defendants, however, are not bound
by the removal notice—they may move to remand and thereby
defeat removal. Accordingly, the distinction between the
intermediate rule and the first-served defendant rule is seen
when subsequently served defendants are served after the first
defendant, but before the expiration of the first-served
defendant’s thirty-day window. For example, if Defendant #1 is
served on Day 1 and Defendant #2 is served on Day 10, under
the first-served defendant rule Defendant #2 has twenty days
to decide whether to join the notice of removal, whereas under
the intermediate rule he would have thirty days. This
difference is hardly a compromise between the first-served and
last-served defendant rules. The intermediate rule offers a
relatively minor difference of statutory interpretation by giving
every subsequently served defendant a full thirty days to
evaluate whether to join an existing removal notice, but adds
nothing to the statute’s motivating principles and policies.79
In sum, due to section 1446(b)’s silence on the issue, and
despite ostensibly relying on the same principles and policies,
the circuits are divided in their application of the statute in the
multiple-defendant context. Indeed, even some of the
challenges in reading the statute are the same: one of the
justifications sometimes proffered in favor of the last-served
rule—that the alternative first-served approach would require
reading “first served” into the statute’s text80—is itself subject
to the same challenge (i.e., the last-served defendant approach
similarly requires reading “last served” into the statute).
Choosing among these approaches has been made more
difficult because the courts’ decisions have failed to recognize
the practical and conceptual dilemma that underlies all the
analyses: the tension between plaintiff control and defendantinitiated removal.
79

See id. at 605 (“Removal statutes . . . must be strictly construed, inasmuch
as the removal of cases from state to federal court raises significant federalism
concerns.”); id. at 613 (stating that the intermediate rule is consistent with
“constru[ing] removal statutes narrowly and that doubts concerning removal should be
resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction”); id. at 611 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
provides a thirty-day removal window and “[i]f you do not seek removal within the
thirty-day window, you have forfeited your right to remove”); id. (rule of unanimity); id.
at 614 (“All three of the rules before the court are consistent with the rule of
unanimity, because each of them requires all of the defendants at some point in time to
unanimously agree to removal.”).
80
See, e.g., Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533
(6th Cir. 1999).
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The Unseen Tension Behind the Rules: The Power to
Select the Forum

Although the majority of federal courts addressing the
issue follows the first-served defendant rule,81 some courts and
commentators have referred to the alternative last-served rule
as the current “trend.”82 All but a few court decisions fail to
acknowledge the unexpressed rationale or concern underlying
the choice between the first-served, last-served, and
intermediate rules: limiting the defendant’s opportunity to
remove (the first-served and intermediate rules) versus
maximizing the defendant’s opportunity to remove (the lastserved rule). In selecting which rule to follow, courts must strike
a balance between a plaintiff’s right to select the forum versus a
defendant’s right to remove to federal court, and this ultimate
choice drives judicial policy. Often—and certainly more often
than is acknowledged—the outcome may depend on the court’s
normative approach as more pro-plaintiff or more pro-defendant.
1. Plaintiff’s Control of the Forum
In Brown v. Demco, Inc.,83 discussed above,84 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit elected to follow the firstserved defendant rule and characterized it as “[t]he general
rule.”85 Although Brown was cast in an unusual posture—the
matter had been proceeding in state court for four years and
removal was sought only after the plaintiff added a new
defendant—concerns that removal would unfairly benefit the
defendants and cause an unfair detriment to the plaintiff
81

See C. Todd Hagins, Sands in an Hourglass: Solving the Puzzle of Time
Limits for Removal to Federal Court, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 421, 423 (2001) (“[A] majority
of federal district courts follow the first-served defendant rule . . . .”).
82
See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The trend in
recent case law favors the later-served defendant rule.”); Bailey v. Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2008) (observing that “the trend in
recent case law favors the last-served defendant rule”); Gen. Pump & Well, Inc. v. Laibe
Supply Corp., No. CV607-30, 2007 WL 3238721, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2007) (“More
recently, . . . the trend in the case law has been toward the later-served rule.”); Hagins,
supra note 81, at 426 (“There is a trend away from the first-served defendant rule.”);
Hale, supra note 32, at 381 (noting that a “concern often cited as supportive of the lastserved rule is the need to prevent a tactical advantage by the plaintiff in manipulating
the removal statute in order to prevent removal to federal court”); Matthew C. Lucas,
Diversity Jurisdiction Removal in Florida, 77 FLA. B.J. 54, 57 (2003) (noting that the lastserved defendant rule “appears to be gaining acceptance in the courts”).
83
792 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1986).
84
See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
85
Brown, 792 F.2d at 481.
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clearly influenced the court. The court noted “the axiom that
the removal statutes are to be strictly construed against
removal,” and stated, in a particularly revealing passage,
Here all of the appellees but [one] not only let the thirty-day period
elapse, but also defended this action in state court for four
years. . . . To permit the defendants in this case to obtain removal
after they have tested state-court waters for four years would give
them a second opportunity to forum-shop and further delay the
progress of the suit. The unfairness of this to the plaintiff outweighs
the unfairness, if any, to the last-joined defendant. The forum for a
suit ought to be settled at some time early in the litigation.86

The Brown Court’s analysis is worth a deeper review.
First, the court relied on the strict construction rule, referring
to construing the statutes “strictly . . . against removal,” thus
indicating its preference for protecting the plaintiff’s choice of
forum.87 Second, the court followed the strict construction rule
with the characterization that the last-joined defendant’s
attempt to remove presented an opportunity to “forum-shop
and further delay the progress of the suit.”88 Third, after
characterizing the defendants in an unfavorable manner (i.e.,
as seeking to delay the proceedings and employ a procedural
route to a more favorable outcome), the court said such forum
shopping and delay were unfair to the plaintiff, who should
have assurances as to the forum “early in the litigation.”89 In
Brown, the plaintiffs did not benefit from section 1446(b)’s oneyear limitation on diversity-based removal; Congress did not
enact the one-year provision until two years after the Brown
decision.90 However, the absence of any outer time limit for
removal at the time of the Brown decision arguably should
have resulted in greater protection of the defendant’s right to
remove, not less. The deference accorded to the plaintiff’s
choice of forum is thus a powerful policy that has the ability
not only to skew certain outcomes in a plaintiff’s favor, but to
actually overcome the defendant’s statutory right to removal.

86

Id. at 482.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Brown v. Demco, Inc. was decided in 1986. See id. Congress added the oneyear limitation to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) in 1988. See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
962 F.2d 513, 515 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the one-year limitation was enacted
on November 19, 1988).
87
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2. Defendant’s Right to Removal and Potential Plaintiff
Manipulation
The potential for manipulation by plaintiffs appears to
play a role in many of the decisions that have chosen the lastserved rule.91 As explained below, the first-served and
intermediate rules encompass the possibility that a plaintiff
suing multiple defendants might strategically use service of
process to defeat removal. In contrast, the last-served rule
eliminates this potential for manipulation by leaving open the
removal option for later-served defendants.
One of the cases expressing concern about plaintiff
manipulation most directly was White v. White,92 a federal district
court decision in which circuit law bound the district court to
follow the first-served defendant rule.93 However, due to concerns
about plaintiff manipulation, the district court concluded that
“exceptional circumstances” permitted removal.94 The district
court stated that the plaintiff set a “removal trap” through “first
serving an unsophisticated defendant who is least likely to
attempt removal. Then the trap is sprung by not serving the
more sophisticated defendants who are likely to attempt removal
until 30 days has elapsed. Snap, removal is barred . . . .”95
Although White is one of the few cases to find the “exceptional
circumstances” exception to the first-served defendant rule
satisfied, its rationale fits justifications for the last-served
defendant rule. As one commentator observed, White’s broad use
of “forum manipulation” as an exceptional circumstance “hints
that any plaintiff failing to serve every known defendant
promptly at the same time runs the risk of failing in a motion to
remand a removed case back to state court.”96
The plaintiff manipulation concern has two alternative
potential sources. On the one hand, when a court frames the
issue as plaintiff manipulation, the court may view deference to
91

See, e.g., McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928
(4th Cir. 1992); White v. White, 32 F. Supp. 2d 890, 893 (W.D. La. 1998), abrogated in
part by Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999); see also
Hale, supra note 32, at 381 (“[A] concern often cited as supportive of the last-served
rule is the need to prevent a tactical advantage by the plaintiff in manipulating the
removal statute in order to prevent removal to federal court.”).
92
32 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
93
Id. at 892-93.
94
Id. at 893.
95
Id.
96
Hagins, supra note 81, at 426 (expressing disbelief that “such a broad
exception” would be considered “an exceptional one”).
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the plaintiff’s choice of forum as desirable, but may view this
particular plaintiff as undeserving because she engaged in
manipulative behavior.97 On the other hand, courts may use
broad-brush characterizations of plaintiff manipulation that
reflect a more generalized distrust of plaintiffs with
corresponding greater sympathy for defendants. In the specific
context of adopting the last-served defendant rule, several
federal courts have employed rationales reflecting a concern
that the first-served rule was simply too pro-plaintiff.98
II.

THE VOLUNTARY-INVOLUNTARY RULE

Section 1446(b)—the underlying source of the first- and
last-served defendant rules—is also the source of the voluntaryinvoluntary rule. Section 1446(b) provides, as relevant to this
discussion,
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of
removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable . . . .99

Although this statutory language suggests that the
defendant has an entitlement to remove upon the specified
receipt of a paper reflecting that a case initially nonremovable
has become removable, there is a judicially created
precondition: the case must have become removable due to the
97

More generally in the field of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, courts
have relied on statutory authority to defeat manipulative efforts to invoke federal court
jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006), but often have tolerated manipulative efforts
to defeat federal court jurisdiction. See Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 161,
163 (D. Me. 1969) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1359 prohibits improper or collusive joinder
to create federal jurisdiction but no similar statute bars collusive action to defeat
federal jurisdiction); see also id. at 165-66 (noting that “many, though not all, federal
courts have sustained the use of assignments to defeat diversity”). There is no pretense
of balanced treatment in this area.
98
See, e.g., Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating
that the first-served defendant rule could “encourage plaintiffs to engage in unfair
manipulation by delaying service on defendants most likely to remove”); Collings v. E-Z
Serve Convenience Stores, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 892, 894 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (stating that
each defendant must be allowed thirty days in which to remove because to hold
otherwise “[o]pens the way for the plaintiff to deliberately avoid removal by delayed
service upon a defendant anticipated to seek removal”); see also McKinney v. Bd. of Trs.
of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that under the firstserved defendant rule, “the rights of defendants generally could be rather easily
overcome by tactical maneuvering by plaintiffs”).
99
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

22

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

plaintiff’s voluntary action.100 Unlike the first- versus lastserved defendant rules, there is no circuit split here—every
circuit addressing the issue has followed the voluntaryinvoluntary rule,101 although there are some differences among
the circuits in the specifics of applying the rule.102 Accordingly,
in a lawsuit filed in state court and based on state law, if the
plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a nondiverse defendant, the
remaining defendant(s) may remove the suit based on
diversity. But if the court dismisses that same nondiverse
defendant without the plaintiff’s consent, then the remaining
defendant(s) may not remove because the plaintiff’s voluntary
action did not accomplish the dismissal. The death of a
nondiverse defendant is the sole exception to the voluntaryinvoluntary rule and permits removal.103
The voluntary-involuntary rule—characterized by one
commentator as having “a questionable pedigree” and “suspect”
justifications104—is a particularly interesting contradiction in
removal jurisprudence. The rule’s origins ostensibly come from
two U.S. Supreme Court decisions a century ago. In Powers v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.,105 the Supreme Court held
that the case became removable after the plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed the nondiverse defendants.106 Subsequently, in

100

See generally John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 998-99 (1998)
(“Under the voluntary-involuntary rule, when a court dismisses a removal-defeating
claim with the plaintiff’s consent, the case becomes removable. However, when such a
dismissal is without the plaintiff’s consent, the case does not become removable despite
the change in its structure.”).
101
See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 510 & n.10 (2004) (citing
eight circuit courts affirming the voluntary-involuntary rule).
102
See Heather R. Barber, Removal and Remand, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1555,
1583 (2004) (explaining that the Second Circuit defines “voluntary” more broadly than
the other circuits to include situations “where the removability of the case is the result
of a decision of the court,” and where the plaintiff elects not to appeal the court’s
decision); Jeff Fisher, Everybody Plays the Fool, Sometimes; There’s No Exception to the
Rule: Procedural Misjoinder Is Not an Exception to the Voluntary-Involuntary Rule, 60
BAYLOR L. REV. 993, 999-1000 (2008) (noting that the circuit courts “sometimes
disagree about what constitutes a voluntary act”).
103
See Bradley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 100 F. Supp. 913, 91718 (E.D. Okla. 1951).
104
James M. Underwood, From Proxy to Principle: Fraudulent Joinder
Reconsidered, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1013, 1026 (2006). Others have similarly criticized the rule. See
Jenkins v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pa., 650 F. Supp. 609, 614 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (describing
the voluntary-involuntary rule as “antiquated” or “arbitrary”); James F. Archibald III, Note,
Reintroducing “Fraud” to the Doctrine of Fraudulent Joinder, 78 VA. L. REV. 1377, 1384 (1992)
(describing the “apparent baselessness” of the voluntary-involuntary rule).
105
169 U.S. 92 (1898).
106
Id. at 102.
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Whitcomb v. Smithson,107 the Supreme Court determined that
the case did not become removable when the trial court
dismissed the nondiverse defendant without the plaintiff’s
assent.108 As summarized by the Eleventh Circuit,
[T]he long-standing, judicially created “voluntary-involuntary”
rule . . . is a rule developed in diversity cases “that if the resident
defendant was dismissed from the case by the voluntary act of the
plaintiff, the case became removable, but if the dismissal was the
result of either the defendant’s or the court’s action against the wish
of the plaintiff, the case could not be removed.”109

Although the court in the excerpt above seems to
suggest that the voluntary-involuntary rule is limited to
diversity cases, courts have applied the rule to both diversity
and arising-under cases.110
Congress amended the removal statutes in 1948 and
again in 1949.111 Some courts and commentators have argued
that the voluntary-involuntary rule did not survive the
amendments because amended section 1446(b) states that “an
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” could render a
case removable;112 the reference to an “order” as rendering a
case removable, without more, seemed to suggest that
voluntariness (or involuntariness) played no role.113

107

175 U.S. 635 (1900).
Id. at 638.
Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 252 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Weems v.
Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967)).
110
See People v. Keating, 986 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Here, this case
was transformed into an action ‘arising under’ federal law not by the voluntary action
of the plaintiff, but instead by action of a defendant. Since a voluntary act by the
plaintiff has not rendered the case removable, it must remain in state court.”).
111
See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 35152 (1999).
112
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006); see also Lyon v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 228 F. Supp. 810,
811 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (“There is nothing in [amended section 1446(b)] from which it can
be properly inferred that Congress intended that a removal could be effected only in the
event the plaintiff voluntarily did something which removed the local defendant from the
case.”); Weems, 380 F.2d at 546-47 (noting that “[t]he effect of [the 1949] amendment has
been variously interpreted,” and that “[i]t is contended . . . that the [voluntaryinvoluntary] rule did not survive an amendment to the Judicial Code in 1949”).
113
See Weems, 380 F.2d at 547-49; see also Joan Steinman, Postremoval
Changes in the Party Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, the New Law, and
Rule 19, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 863, 872 n.25 (1990) (“[C]ommentators had observed that it
was not entirely clear whether the voluntary-involuntary distinction had survived the
1949 amendments to § 1446.”); Underwood, supra note 104, at 1100, 1106 (stating that
“there is nothing in the language of the statute to suggest any intent to require federal
courts to continue utilizing the voluntary/involuntary rule—the bare language of the
statute at least hinting at the inverse,” and urging that the rule be abandoned).
108
109
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The Supreme Court has explained the basic history
leading up to the 1948 and 1949 amendments to section
1446(b); the concerns that motivated the amendments did not
involve the voluntary-involuntary rule, but rather centered on
the concern that the defendant have access to the complaint
before the removal period commenced.114
Despite the potential argument that the statutory
amendments eliminated the voluntary-involuntary rule, the
federal circuit courts ultimately rejected this contention.115 One
court explained,
We will not buck the trend, nor will we rehash the legislative history.
Suffice it to say that when Congress referred to “a case which is or has
become removable” in section 1446(b), Congress apparently intended
to incorporate the existing definition of “removable,” a definition that
included the voluntary/involuntary rule.116

This offers a plausible, but not a mandated, interpretation of
the 1948 and 1949 amendments. The congressional report,
which courts have cited for the proposition that Congress

114

Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 351-52.

Prior to 1948, a defendant could remove a case any time before the expiration
of her time to respond to the complaint under state law. Because the time
limits for responding to the complaint varied from State to State, however,
the period for removal correspondingly varied. To reduce the disparity,
Congress in 1948 enacted the original version of § 1446(b), which provided
that “[t]he petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding may be filed
within twenty days after commencement of the action or service of process,
whichever is later.” . . . Congress soon recognized, however, that § 1446(b), as
first framed, did not “give adequate time and operate uniformly” in all States.
In States such as New York, most notably, service of the summons
commenced the action, and such service could precede the filing of the
complaint. Under § 1446(b) as originally enacted, the period for removal in
such a State could have expired before the defendant obtained access to the
complaint. To ensure that the defendant would have access to the complaint
before commencement of the removal period, Congress in 1949 enacted the
current version of § 1446(b): “The petition for removal of a civil action or
proceeding shall be filed within twenty days [now thirty days] after the
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or
proceeding is based.”
Id. (citations omitted).
115
See Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 71-72 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that although defendants argued that section 1446(b) had eliminated the rule, “[e]very
court of appeals that has addressed the voluntary/involuntary rule has held that it
survived the enactment of section 1446(b)” (citation omitted)).
116
Id. at 72.
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intended to retain the rule, is more ambiguous than the courts
have suggested.117
A closer look at the cited report illustrates that the
courts have lifted one particular quotation out of context. In
fact, although we have set out the relevant portion of the report
in full in the footnote below,118 the simple addition of the
sentence preceding and the sentence following the lifted
quotation make the context apparent:
The second paragraph of the amendment to [section 1446,] subsection
(b) is intended to make clear that the right of removal may be
exercised at a later stage of the case if the initial pleading does not
state a removable case but its removability is subsequently disclosed.
This is declaratory of the existing rule laid down by the decisions. (See
for example, Powers v. Chesapeake etc., Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92.)119

117

Id. (citing a quote from the Senate Report that the amendment is
“declaratory of the existing rule laid down by the decisions”).
118
The relevant description of the bill in full states:
Subsection (b) of section 1446 of title 28, U.S.C., as revised, has been found to
create difficulty in those States, such as New York, where suit is commenced
by the service of a summons and the plaintiff’s initial pleading is not required
to be served or filed until later.
The first paragraph of the amendment to subsection (b) corrects this
situation by providing that the petition for removal need not be filed until 20
days after the defendant has received a copy of the plaintiff’s initial pleading.
This provision, however, without more, would create further difficulty in
those States, such as Kentucky, where suit is commenced by the filing of the
plaintiff’s initial pleading and the issuance and service of summons without
any requirement that a copy of the pleading be served upon or otherwise
furnished to the defendant. Accordingly the first paragraph of the
amendment provides that in such cases the petition for removal shall be filed
within 20 days after the service of the summons.
The first paragraph of the amendment conforms to the amendment of rule
81(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to removed actions,
adopted by the Supreme Court on December 29, 1948, and reported by the
Court to the present session of Congress.
The second paragraph of the amendment to subsection (b) is intended to
make clear that the right of removal may be exercised at a later stage of the
case if the initial pleading does not state a removable case but its
removability is subsequently disclosed. This is declaratory of the existing rule
laid down by the decisions. (See for example, Powers v. Chesapeake etc., Ry.
Co., 169 U.S. 92.)
In addition, this amendment clarifies the intent of section 1446(e) of title 28,
U.S.C., to indicate that notice need not be given simultaneously with the
filing, but may be given promptly thereafter.
H.R. REP. NO. 81-352, at 11 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1254, 1268.
119
Id.
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The federal courts have concluded that the reference to
“removable” in the quotation above was intended to incorporate
all existing case law refinements. This is certainly a plausible
construction—in these amendments, Congress was focused
primarily on addressing one particular issue (ensuring that
defendants would have access to a copy of the complaint before
the removal period commenced), and secondarily on clarifying
that removal due to changed circumstances could occur late in
the case proceedings. However, it is at least equally plausible
that due to these same foci, Congress would have expressly
included the voluntary-involuntary rule if it intended to
preserve it.120 The lack of any statutory reference to the
voluntary-involuntary rule—especially in an era of “plain
meaning” statutory construction—suggests that courts should
exercise extreme caution in continuing to import the rule in the
absence of any specific statutory language. In particular,
Powers, cited in the congressional report, had permitted the
defendant to remove after the plaintiff dismissed claims
against the nondiverse defendants despite the fact that these
dismissals occurred, and thus removal was sought “when [the
case] was called for trial.”121
Thus, Powers serves as an example of authorizing a
defendant to remove on the basis of subsequent removability at
a very late point in the proceedings, namely the eve of trial, but
it is far less clear that Congress intended this reference to
affirm the continued viability of the voluntary-involuntary rule.
Lacking any clear statutory direction, the continued viability of
the voluntary-involuntary distinction—if any justification
remains—must rest on the articulated principles and policies

120

Cf. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566-67
(2005) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 by its plain text overruled both Clark v. Paul
Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939) and Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973)). Despite a vigorous dissent, the Court rejected arguments that congressional
reports indicated an intention to leave the holdings from those prior decisions intact:
Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent
they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of
otherwise ambiguous terms. . . . [J]udicial reliance on legislative materials
like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements
of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet,
unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt
strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were
unable to achieve through the statutory text.
Id. at 568.
121

Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 98 (1898).
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that courts have used to justify the rule. The next section
addresses these policy pillars.
A.

The Articulated Principles and Policies Motivating the
Voluntary-Involuntary Rule

The voluntary-involuntary rule appears to have two
primary directing purposes: (1) promoting judicial economy122
and (2) deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.123 The
judicial-economy rationale comes entirely from circuit court
decisions; the Supreme Court has never proffered a judicialeconomy rationale for the rule.124 This judicial-economy
rationale appears to stem from finality concerns. If a court
dismisses a nondiverse defendant from the action through an
involuntary dismissal and the dismissal is appealed, the
potential exists that the appellate court could set aside the
dismissal, which would destroy complete diversity.125

122

See, e.g., Poulos, 959 F.2d at 72.
See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918) (“The obvious
principle . . . is that . . . the plaintiff may by the allegations of his complaint determine
the status with respect to removability of a case, arising under a law of the United
States, when it is commenced, and that this power to determine the removability of his
case continues with the plaintiff throughout the litigation, so that whether such a case
nonremovable when commenced shall afterwards become removable depends not upon
what the defendant may allege or prove or what the court may, after hearing upon the
merits, in invitum, order, but solely upon the form which the plaintiff by his voluntary
action shall give to the pleadings in the case as it progresses towards a conclusion.”).
124
Jenkins v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (N.D. Ga.
1986) (“Study of the Supreme Court cases that developed the rule discloses that the
voluntary-involuntary rule is not based upon an appealability/finality rationale . . . .”);
Archibald, supra note 104, at 1386 (“Predictably, courts continuing to adhere solely to
the Supreme Court’s stated rationale for the rule have rejected these cases and,
accordingly, have deemphasized the role of federal courts in allocating cases between
state and federal forums.”).
125
Higgins v. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1988).
123

[I]f the non-diverse party has been involuntary dismissed by order of the
state judge[, t]he plaintiff may choose to appeal the dismissal. Although
complete diversity may temporarily exist between the parties, suggesting
that removal is proper, diversity jurisdiction may ultimately be destroyed if
the state appellate court reverses the dismissal of the non-diverse party.
Therefore, some cases are not removable despite complete diversity between
the parties.
Id.; see also Am. Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311, 316 (1915) (“[W]here
there is a joint cause of action against defendants resident of the same state with the
plaintiff and a nonresident defendant, it must appear, to make the case a removable
one as to a nonresident defendant because of dismissal as to resident defendants, that
the discontinuance as to such defendants was voluntary on the part of the plaintiff, and
that such action has taken the resident defendants out of the case, so as to leave a
controversy wholly between the plaintiff and the nonresident defendant.”).

28

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

In addition to the finality/appealability concern, “[t]here
also appears to be a policy favoring a plaintiff’s right, absent
fraudulent joinder, to determine the removability of his case.”126
The Supreme Court decisions that address the voluntaryinvoluntary rule cite only this second purpose.127 Courts have
analogized the deference accorded to the plaintiff’s forum
choice by the voluntary-involuntary rule to the Mottley rule128 in
arising-under cases, whereby the presence (or absence) of
arising-under jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, without regard to the
defendant’s pleadings or the defendant’s anticipated defenses.129
However, the analogy of the voluntary-involuntary rule to
Mottley raises its own issues and ultimately leads right back to
the underlying tension between according deference to the
plaintiff’s choice of forum and the defendant’s right to remove.
B.

Mottley and the Deference Debate

Courts have analogized the voluntary-involuntary rule,
founded upon deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, to the
Mottley “well-pleaded complaint” rule in arising-under cases.130
However, the Mottley analogy is less helpful—and less apt—
than it appears initially. First, the Mottley rule is not always
clear in application. In applying the Mottley rule, a court
should disregard the defendant’s pleadings and examine only

126

Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 253 (11th Cir. 1988). Concerns regarding
plaintiff manipulation have been partially addressed by declining to apply the voluntaryinvoluntary rule to situations involving fraudulent joinder. See id. (“absent fraudulent
joinder”); see also Great N. Ry. Co., 246 U.S. at 282 (“The obvious principle of [the
voluntary-involuntary rule] is that, in the absence of fraudulent purpose to defeat
removal, the plaintiff may by the allegations of his complaint determine the status with
respect to removability of a case . . . .”). With respect to fraudulent joinder, see generally
Fisher, supra note 102, at 1012-15 (arguing that “[p]rocedural misjoinder and fraudulent
joinder behave almost identically,” and that neither is technically an “exception” to the
voluntary-involuntary rule; rather, the voluntary-involuntary rule simply “should not be
applied to those claims”); see also Underwood, supra note 104, at 1018 (“Stated simply,
fraudulent joinder is a doctrine that permits federal courts to essentially ignore the
inclusion in a lawsuit of a nondiverse party who would otherwise destroy federal diversity
jurisdiction when the district court concludes that the party’s joinder is a sham.”).
127
See Jenkins, 650 F. Supp. at 613-14 (“What emerges from an examination
of the Supreme Court cases on the voluntary-involuntary rule is the conclusion that the
rule is not based upon an appealability/finality rationale but upon a policy favoring the
plaintiff’s ‘power to determine the removability of his case.’”).
128
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
129
See Insinga, 845 F.2d at 253 (noting “[t]he common origins of the
voluntary-involuntary rule with Mottley and its progeny in federal question cases”).
130
See supra notes 123, 126-30 and accompanying text.
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the complaint.131 Next, the court must ascertain whether the
complaint’s allegations support arising-under jurisdiction as
“well pleaded” and that the complaint does not include
anticipated federal defenses. This review can be more difficult
than one might think,132 and a plaintiff may draft her complaint
in a manner specifically intended to keep the action in state
court by scrupulously avoiding the inclusion of any apparent
basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction—yet nevertheless
find herself in the very federal court that she had sought to
avoid. One prominent example of such a circumstance occurred
in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing.133 In Grable, the plaintiff constructed its
lawsuit as a quiet title action filed in Michigan state court, only
to find its suit removed to federal court on the basis of arisingunder jurisdiction.134 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
quiet title action, although a state-law claim, necessarily raised
the federal issue of whether the Internal Revenue Service had
given Grable the notice required by section 6335 of the Tax
Code before seizing Grable’s property to satisfy a federal tax
delinquency and then subsequently selling the property to
Darue.135 The Court held that this federal issue was of sufficient
importance to invoke arising-under jurisdiction.136 The fact that
a sufficiently necessary, albeit latent, federal issue lay within
the state claim took away the plaintiff’s preferred state forum
and substituted a federal one.
Of course, Grable’s federal issue, although latent,
existed from the very outset of the litigation, whereas
situations involving the voluntary-involuntary rule, by
definition, arise due to some change occurring subsequent to
the filing of the lawsuit. And if this distinction is not enough,
131

Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152.
Id. at 152-53.
133
545 U.S. 308 (2005).
134
Id. at 311.
135
Id. at 314-15.
136
Id. at 315-16. Similarly, a plaintiff may draft her complaint in a manner
intended to permit her to litigate in federal court, and yet nevertheless find that the
federal court she desired will not allow her to remain. An example of this circumstance
occurred in Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006), in
which the dissent observed, “There is little about this case that is not federal.” Id. at
702 (Breyer, J., dissenting). A private insurance carrier, providing health insurance to
federal employees pursuant to a contract with the federal government as authorized by
a federal statute, sought reimbursement from one such federal employee in accordance
with the terms of the federal contract. The Court’s majority held that the action was
merely a contractual claim for reimbursement, and thus lacking arising-under
jurisdiction, it could not proceed in federal court. Id. at 692-93 (majority opinion).
132
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analysis of the Mottley rule arises in a contextually distinct
environment from the voluntary-involuntary analysis. The
Mottley rule always concerns the four corners of the complaint
and thus always has as its vantage point the outset of the
litigation, whereas the voluntary-involuntary rule always
concerns some later change in the contours of the litigation.
Moreover, although the Mottley rule applies only to arisingunder jurisdiction, the voluntary-involuntary rule applies to
both arising-under and diversity, which creates the potential
for a plaintiff to “double dip”—to obtain the benefit of the
Mottley rule in determining the existence of arising-under
jurisdiction in the first instance, plus the benefit of the
voluntary-involuntary rule after subsequent changes. So even
assuming that the Mottley analogy is still apt, it appears that
the voluntary-involuntary rule as currently applied may accord
too much deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Just as the
Mottley rule cannot insulate a plaintiff from arising-under
jurisdiction that actually exists, so too the voluntaryinvoluntary rule should not generally insulate a plaintiff from
removal when federal jurisdiction actually exists.
Although courts have expressly applied the Mottley
analogy only to the plaintiff’s control rationale, the Grable
decision serves as a reminder that forum selection is a twoway, rather than a one-way, street. If plaintiffs were accorded
complete control over forum selection, the removal statutes
would be rendered pointless. As noted by one commentator,
“Removal does not deprive plaintiffs of any ‘right,’ but merely
affords defendants an equal opportunity to litigate in federal
court. . . . Additionally, removal does not expand federal
jurisdiction, but merely allows cases involving federal
jurisdiction to be heard in a federal court.”137 Accordingly, the
voluntary-involuntary rule would appear to rest on a largely
empty analytical basis.
III.

THE ONE-YEAR LIMITATION

In 1988, Congress amended section 1446(b) to provide
that “a case may not be removed on the basis of [diversity
jurisdiction] more than 1 year after commencement of the
action.”138 This generates questions over a third issue of belated
removal and yet another contradiction within the doctrine—an
137
138

Haiber, supra note 17, at 611-12.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
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absolute cutoff that applies to some, but not all, removal
circumstances. Perhaps the primary issue with respect to this
provision is why defendants seeking to remove on the basis of
arising-under jurisdiction have no outer time limit, whereas
defendants seeking to remove on the basis of diversity face a
one-year time limit. The legislative history to the 1988
amendment suggests that “[t]he amendment addresses
problems that arise from a change of parties as an action
progresses toward trial in state court. . . . Removal late in the
proceedings may result in substantial delay and disruption.”139
However, imposing a one-year limitation on diversity
removal, but not arising-under removal, indicates that the
concern is not the potential disruption of ongoing state
proceedings but simply reflects disfavor toward diversity
jurisdiction.140 Despite the seemingly straightforward nature of
this provision, two interpretive issues have plagued the courts:
first, whether the one-year limitation reflects a jurisdictional
bar141 or merely a procedural defect,142 and second, whether the
one-year limitation applies to all diversity removals143 or only to
those that were not removable originally.144 Although not as
obvious, these issues once again expose the underlying tension
between plaintiff’s-deference and defendant’s-right-to-remove.
The legislative documents reveal that in enacting the
one-year limitation on diversity-based removal, Congress
intended to reduce “the opportunity for removal after
substantial progress has been made in state court.”145 Rather
than attempting to define “substantial progress,” Congress
139

H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 44 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,
6032-33; see also Riverdale Baptist Church v. Certainteed Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 943,
950 (D. Md. 2004) (quoting same).
140
See Oakley, supra note 100, at 1002 (“This [one-year limitation] rule has
been strongly and aptly criticized as a backhanded attack on diversity jurisdiction . . . .”);
see also Underwood, supra note 104, at 1105 (“The fact that this concern does not pertain
to federal question cases demonstrates an anti-diversity bias on the part of Congress.”).
141
See Howell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 955 F. Supp. 660, 662-63
(M.D. La. 1997); Price v. Messer, 872 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D.W. Va. 1995); Foiles v.
Merrell Nat’l Labs., 730 F. Supp. 108, 110 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
142
See In re Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 104 F.3d 322, 324 (11th Cir. 1997);
Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992); Kinabrew v.
Emco-Wheaton, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 351, 352-53 (M.D. La. 1996); see also Tedford v.
Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426-28 (5th Cir. 2003) (approving an equitable
tolling exception when circumstances suggest possible manipulation by plaintiff).
143
See Foiles, 730 F. Supp. at 110.
144
See Brown v. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 284 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir.
2002); Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534-35 (6th Cir.
1999); Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
145
Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 1016(b), 102 Stat. 4669 (1988).
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adopted a flat one-year limit and thereby created a provision
simultaneously underinclusive and overinclusive. The
provision is underinclusive because it does not apply to removal
based on arising-under jurisdiction even if the state court has
made substantial progress in the case; the provision is also
overinclusive by preventing diversity-based removal after one
year even in those cases where no substantial progress has
been made in state court. As a court reviewing one such case
observed, “It is very difficult to see how a removal under the
facts of this case can interfere with the state court proceedings
when none have occurred because of plaintiffs’ decision to
withhold service until the one year time limitation has
expired.”146
With respect to the competing jurisdictional versus
procedural interpretations applicable to the one-year
limitation, a jurisdictional approach to the one-year limit
serves to bar outright any attempt to remove after one year.147
Such an approach results when courts apply a strict statutory
construction to the removal statutes—a construction that, as
we have seen, exalts the plaintiff-deference policy over the
defendant’s statutory right to remove. This jurisdictional
approach is far from uniform, however, with a number of courts
concluding that the one-year limit is procedural and thus
potentially subject to equitable considerations.148 Indeed, dicta
146

Martine v. Nat’l Tea Co., 837 F. Supp. 749, 750 (M.D. La. 1993).
See Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1328 (N.D. Okla.
2003) (concluding that statutory language was clear and refusing to “create”
jurisdiction beyond the one-year period); Mantz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No.
Civ. A. 2:03-0506, 2003 WL 21383830, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. June 13, 2003) (concluding
that the “plain language of the statute . . . . ‘erect[s] an absolute bar to removal’”
(quoting Lovern v. GMC, 121 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1997))); Rashid v. Schenck Constr.
Co., 843 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (one-year limit divests the court of
jurisdiction); Brock v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 721, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1992)
(ability to remove lapses after one year), aff’d, 7 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1993). Recent
Supreme Court decisions have expressed a strong preference for finding rules to be
nonjurisdictional unless they govern “a court’s adjudicatory capacity, that is, its
subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. . . . Other rules, even if important and
mandatory, we have said, should not be given the jurisdictional brand.” Henderson ex
rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202-03 (2011) (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243-44 (2010); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596 (2009)).
148
See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992)
(one-year limit is procedural, not jurisdictional, and thus can be waived); see also Tedford
v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2003) (court may consider parties’
conduct in determining whether it is equitable to apply the one-year limit strictly); id. at
426 n.4 (citing cases concluding that the one-year limit was subject to equitable
exceptions); Wise v. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., No. Civ. JFM-02-2323, 2002 WL
2001529, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2002) (finding that plaintiff had “engaged in ‘forum
manipulation’ in an effort to defeat the defendant’s removal right,” and stating, “[i]t
147
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in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis decision
referring to the one-year provision as “nonjurisdictional”149
suggest that the Court viewed the one-year limit as
procedural.150 Perhaps an even more interesting issue is
whether the one-year limit applies both to cases initially
removable and those not initially removable.
A fuller excerpt from section 1446(b) aids in
understanding the debate between applying the one-year limit
to all cases or only those that were not initially removable. In
its entirety, section 1446(b) provides:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service
or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim
upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days
after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial
pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served
on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of
removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable,
except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction
conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after
commencement of the action.151

The one-year limitation for diversity-based removals
appears as the final clause of the second paragraph above. By
appearing in this particular place within the statute, the oneyear limitation seems to act as a modifying or qualifying
phrase only with respect to the second paragraph of section
1446(b), and some courts have therefore applied it only to cases
that initially were nonremovable.152 However, other courts have

would be disrespectful to Congress to conclude that it contemplated that a litigant’s right
to a federal forum could be defeated simply by an adverse party employing the strategem
of secreting the federal nature of a claim by failing to claim before the one-year limit
established by § 1446(b) the true amount of damages she is seeking”).
149
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 n.13 (1996); see also Henderson ex
rel. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202-03 (noting that rules other than those governing a
court’s subject-matter or personal jurisdiction should be deemed nonjurisdictional); Reed
Elsevier, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 1243-44 (same); Union Pac. R.R. Co., 130 S. Ct. at 596 (same).
150
See Caterpillar, Inc., 519 U.S. at 75 n.13 (referring to the one-year
provision as “nonjurisdictional”).
151
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
152
See, e.g., Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 53435 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that if Congress had intended the one-year limit to apply
to all diversity-based removals it would have stated so more clearly).
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applied the one-year limit to all diversity-based removals,
thereby interpreting the limitation to apply both to initially
removable cases as well as to those that were not initially
removable.153 The courts that have offered this interpretation
have emphasized that they must strictly construe the removal
statutes against removal—an approach, as we have seen, used
to accord deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum over the
defendant’s right to remove.154
With the competing policies of the plaintiff’s right to
forum selection and the defendant’s right to remove to federal
court now more fully revealed, we can now set out a framework
that will generate a more consistent approach to the complex
set of issues generated by removal involving section 1446(b).
IV.

TOWARD A MORE CONSISTENT CONSTRUCTION OF
SECTION 1446(b)

This article has examined three contradictory provisions
within section 1446(b), two implied and one express, that arise
within
the
removal
context:
the
first-served/lastserved/intermediate rules, the voluntary-involuntary rule, and
the one-year limitation on diversity-based removal. A key
insight into the resolution of these issues, whether by the
courts or by Congress, is recognizing that the debates are not
simply disputes over removal doctrine, but reflect the
underlying tension in American procedure between plaintiff
choices and defendant responses. In this part, we will analyze
and synthesize the issues raised by these provisions in order to
set out a more consistent analytical framework for considering
late-arising removal efforts.
A.

Underlying Policies

We begin with a review of policies, again both express and
implied, that underlie and motivate these provisions. There are at
least six such policies: (1) the statutory language itself, in its
provision for removal by defendants as a general matter and in its
more specific provisions of a thirty-day window for removal and of
the one-year limitation on diversity-based removal; (2) the axiom
153

See Rezendes v. Dow Corning Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1435, 1437 (E.D. Cal. 1989).
To the extent that one might question whether the one-year limitation
negatively impacts defendants, one need only look to the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, which was heavily promoted by defendant interests and resulted in eliminating
the one-year rule in certain class actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453.
154
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that courts should interpret the removal statutes strictly; (3) the
judicially imposed rule of unanimity; (4) the promotion of judicial
economy; (5) deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (6) an
apparent disfavor of diversity jurisdiction. These policies reflect at
least three inherent contradictions critical to the construction of a
more consistent framework.
First, the policies mix deference to the plaintiff’s choice
of forum with the defendant’s statutory entitlement to removal.
Second, the policies mix strict statutory construction principles
with the addition of judicially created conditions and rules.
Third, the policies mix an articulated goal of judicial economy
with the potential for removing cases to a new federal forum
after they have long lingered in a state forum. Our next step is
to ask whether any of these contradictions yields ready
answers or contributes to a potential analytical framework.
The mix of strict statutory construction with judicially
created conditions and rules is a somewhat common situation155
without a ready solution, because it does not necessarily
require compromise. Instead, courts and legislators could
pursue a range of possible options. Courts could strictly
construe
the
removal
statutes
and
prohibit
any
supplementation with judicially created conditions and rules.
Alternatively, they could honor any number of judicially
created rules in addition to, or in explication of, the statutory
language. In light of the current prevalence of a “plain
language” approach to statutory construction, and for the sake
of clarity, Congress could amend section 1446(b) to include any
desired judicially created rules expressly and mandate that any
rules not so included are expressly rejected.
The mix of judicial-economy concerns with the potential
for late removal similarly does not yield any ready resolution:
some sort of compromise appears required, yet the strength of
these competing interests yields a range of choices. This leaves
the mix of deference to the plaintiff’s forum choice with the
defendant’s right to remove.
155

See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908)
(creating “well pleaded complaint” rule in federal arising-under cases, despite the
absence of any such express requirement in the federal arising-under statute); Chi.,
Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900) (reaffirming “rule of
unanimity” when defendants seek to remove a civil action from state to federal court,
despite the absence of any such express requirement in the federal removal statute);
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (creating “complete diversity”
rule in federal diversity jurisdiction cases, despite the absence of any such express
requirement in the federal diversity statute).
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In examining the conflict between preserving the
plaintiff’s choice of forum and honoring the defendant’s right to
remove to federal court when the statutory preconditions are
satisfied (which also implicates interpreting the removal
statutes strictly), compromise is an absolute necessity. If the
policy of deferring to the plaintiff’s forum choice was not
subject to compromise, then the plaintiff’s forum choice would
become absolute and the removal statutes would serve no
purpose—deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of forum would,
absent compromise, constitute both the beginning and the end
of the discussion and would displace any potential for removal.
Accordingly, courts must recognize the axiom regarding
deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum for what it is—a
starting point but not the only point of consideration. The
defendant’s right of removal is exactly that—a right, so long as
the defendant satisfies the statutory prerequisites. A 1907 U.S.
Supreme Court decision stated this plainly and directly:
[T]he Federal courts may, and should, take such action as will defeat
attempts to wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in Federal
courts of the protection of their rights in those tribunals. . . . Federal
courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a
Federal court where one has that right.156

Some cases have expressly articulated a mistaken belief
that the plaintiff’s choice of forum should trump the
defendant’s statutory right of removal.157 Those cases stand in
stark contrast to other, older case decisions clearly stating that
a defendant’s right of removal is equal in stature, and of the
same constitutional dimension, as a plaintiff’s right to select a
forum.158 As the Supreme Court has said, to allow plaintiffs to
156

Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 182-83, 186

(1907).
157

See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 219 n.11 (5th Cir.
1998) (“The defendant’s right to remove and the plaintiff’s right to choose the forum are
not equal.”), rev’d, 526 U.S. 574 (1999); Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp.
2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (“The plaintiff’s right to choose his forum is superior to
the defendant’s right of removal.”).
158
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
The constitution of the United States was designed for the common and equal
benefit of all the people of the United States. The judicial power was granted
for the same benign and salutary purposes. It was not to be exercised
exclusively for the benefit of parties who might be plaintiffs, and would elect
the national forum, but also for the protection of defendants who might be
entitled to try their rights, or assert their privileges, before the same forum.
Id. at 348; see also Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606, 609 (1897) (referring to
“defendant’s constitutional right as a citizen of a different State than the plaintiff, to
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“always elect the state court” renders the protection of diversity
jurisdiction ineffective for defendants and “[s]uch a state of
things can, in no respect, be considered as giving equal
rights.”159 Rather, Congress authorized removal so that
defendants would not be “deprived of all the security which the
constitution intended in aid of [their] rights.”160 By virtue of the
fact that a defendant cannot automatically thwart the
plaintiff’s choice of forum in every instance but instead can
remove only under the circumstances prescribed by statute, the
removal statutes constitute a congressional compromise
between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. It remains
to apply this framework to resolve the issues that arise in the
context of statutory construction—and accordingly, the next
question becomes the extent to which a strict statutory
construction should be modified by judicially created conditions
and rules, which brings us full circle. At this point, a return to
each of the three identified removal issues will provide the
context necessary for our framework.
B.

Applying Policies to the Rules

This section applies the policies identified above and
illustrates how these policies impact each of the rules explored.
1. The First-Served, Last-Served, and Intermediate
Rules
Returning first to the first-served, last-served, and
intermediate rules, and assuming that the rule of unanimity is
here to stay, the question becomes which of the three
approaches strikes the better compromise between deferring to
the plaintiff’s choice of forum and the defendant’s right to
removal. The conclusion appears straightforward: the lastserved defendant rule honors both the plaintiff’s right of forum
selection and the defendant’s right of removal. Although some
courts have claimed that the first-served rule does no injustice
to defendants due to the rule of unanimity,161 the first-served
choose a federal forum”); Boatmen’s Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650, 655 (8th
Cir. 1905) (stating that a defendant’s right of removal “is of sufficient value and gravity
to be guarantied by the Constitution and the acts of Congress”); In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that a defendant’s right
of removal “emanates from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution”).
159
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 349.
160
Id.
161
See, e.g., Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1986).
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rule is susceptible to potential manipulation: the plaintiff
might serve less sophisticated defendants first in an attempt to
preclude removal.162 The last-served rule deprives the plaintiff
of no valid right or privilege—the plaintiff loses only the ability
to manipulate the timing of service so as to potentially reduce
the likelihood of removal—whereas the first-served rule
potentially deprives later-served defendants of their right to
removal. Accordingly, the last-served defendant rule appears to
offer the better compromise.163
2. The Voluntary-Involuntary Rule
The
voluntary-involuntary
rule
presents
the
contradiction between deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of
forum and the defendant’s right to removal in a very direct
manner. Remember that deference to the plaintiff’s choice of
forum is the Supreme Court’s sole articulated justification for
the voluntary-involuntary rule.164 But it is unclear why
deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum should trump the
defendant’s right to remove in the context of a subsequent
change in circumstances.165
Although the plaintiff is said to be the master of her
166
claim, no obvious reason explains why the plaintiff should
maintain ongoing control after filing the complaint, especially
when such ongoing control implicates concerns that a plaintiff
could manipulate amendments and dismissals in such a
manner as to defeat the defendant’s right to removal. The
162

See supra note 91 and accompanying text (providing examples).
See Howard B. Stravitz, Recocking the Removal Trigger, 53 S.C. L. REV.
185, 202 (2002) (opining that it “is undoubtedly correct that the first-served defendant
rule unfairly shifts [the] balance in favor of plaintiffs”); see also McKinney v. Bd. of Trs.
of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 927-28 (4th Cir. 1992) (“‘Congress created the
removal process to protect defendants. It did not extend such protection with one hand,
and with the other give plaintiffs a bag of tricks to overcome it.’” (quoting McKinney v.
Bd. of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 713 F. Supp. 185, 189 (W.D.N.C. 1989))).
164
See Jenkins v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pa., 650 F. Supp. 609, 613-14
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (“What emerges from an examination of the Supreme Court cases on
the voluntary-involuntary rule is the conclusion that the rule is not based upon an
appealability/finality rationale but upon a policy favoring the plaintiff’s ‘power to
determine the removability of his case.’” (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246
U.S. 276, 282 (1918)).
165
See Underwood, supra note 104, at 1098 (“The voluntary/ involuntary rule
is not just antiquated, but lacking any principled bases. It acts as merely another
court-created doctrine designed to limit the ability of litigants to utilize the services of
the federal tribunals, trampling on principles of federalism.”).
166
See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826,
831 (2002) (referring to plaintiff as “the master of the complaint” (quoting Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1996))).
163
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plaintiff is entitled to the initial forum choice and permitted to
attempt to structure her lawsuit in such a manner as to avoid
federal subject-matter jurisdiction, such as by suing under state
law rather than federal law, suing nondiverse defendants, or
limiting the recovery sought to one below the jurisdictional
threshold. However, the extreme deference to the plaintiff’s
choice of forum reflected in the voluntary-involuntary rule seems
especially incongruous in light of other ways that we permit
defendants to alter the litigation, such as by adding parties,167
asserting counterclaims and cross-claims,168 and moving for
transfers of venue.169 Extending the plaintiff’s control beyond the
initial filing, so that defendants cannot exercise their right of
removal in an instance where federal subject-matter jurisdiction
plainly exists, unduly defers to the plaintiff’s forum selection at
the expense of the defendant’s right of removal.
3. The One-Year Limitation
Finally, we turn to the one-year limitation on diversitybased removal. As an initial matter, no obvious rationale
explains the purpose of imposing an outer one-year time limit on
the removal of diversity cases, but no outer time limit
whatsoever on the removal of arising-under cases. This presents
two potential options: eliminating the one-year limitation on
diversity-based removal so that there is no time limit for either
diversity or arising-under cases, or imposing an outer time
limitation on both diversity and arising-under removal.
In answer to concerns about the one-year limitation as
tending to encourage plaintiff manipulation (such as waiting
until the expiration of the one-year limit before dismissing a
nondiverse defendant), the elimination of the one-year limit
would remove this concern and put all bases for removal on the
same footing. However, the lack of any outer time limit would
permit removal after state courts have potentially invested
substantial time and resources in the case, which is
inconsistent with judicial-economy concerns. An appropriate
compromise in this instance might be for Congress to
implement an outer time limitation for all removal, regardless
of whether the basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction is
diversity or arising-under. This would eliminate the apparent
167
168
169

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 14.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 13.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
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bias against diversity jurisdiction, would address the
articulated concern about removal after state courts have made
substantial investments in the case, and would resolve the
current dispute as to whether the time limit applies to all cases
or only to those not initially removable. Further, Congress
could specify that the time limitation is subject to equitable
considerations. This would eliminate the current dispute about
whether the provision is jurisdictional or procedural; it would
also serve to clarify that courts will not look favorably upon the
perpetrators of strategic manipulation (e.g., failure to
investigate by defendants, or delays in serving defendants or
amending pleadings by plaintiffs). Importantly, Congress, as
the creator of the statutory limitation on diversity-based
removal, must make the choice about applicable amendments
to current removal provisions.
CONCLUSION
When removal from state to federal court is delayed
beyond the initial thirty days after the action is commenced,
such subsequently instituted removal potentially implicates
three complicating issues that are all rooted in section 1446(b):
the first-served/last-served/intermediate rules, the voluntaryinvoluntary rule, and the one-year limitation on diversitybased removal. These three issues have developed
independently, which has masked the potential for a unifying
analytical framework. This article has identified the
underlying policies, analyzed the inherent contradictions, and
proposed resolutions more consistent with the dual and equal
goals of honoring the plaintiff’s choice of forum and honoring
the defendant’s right of removal.

